OAS bogged down over the “rogue” co-presidents of Nicaragua
in Divergentes, September 3, 2026
by Wilfredo Miranda Aburto
The meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the OAS on Nicaragua continues without a date nor roadmap, according to diplomatic sources consulted by DIVERGENTES. The positions of several government are increasingly “contaminated” by their bilateral relations with the Trump administration. Canada and Chile are retreating, Mexico and Brazil have reservations, and Washington faces questioning over a policy considered “contradictory”: on the one hand it urges its members to immediately “cease maintaining normal relations with Managua”, and on the other hand, is trying to reestablish their diplomatic representation at its highest level naming a new ambassador.
The Nicaragua which Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo govern is the “rogue” country in the Organization of American States (OAS). Not only did it abandon the hemispheric forum in 2023, but periodically continues challenging the region in extreme ways, as happened with the constitutional reform approved this past September 1st, which extends for an additional year the co-presidential mandate and confirms at the highest level the electoral proscription of the opposition. Even in spite of the brutal repression of 2018 as a prelude, the member countries “continue without knowing what to do” with Managua.
The biggest proof of that, according to political and diplomatic sources consulted by DIVERGENTES, is that they still have not achieved a consensus to even set a date for the meeting of Foreign Ministers called to address the crisis, after the Permanent Council approved the convocation this past August 19th.
“The most serious problem is that not only do they not have a date, but they do not even have the content about what the foreign ministers will discuss, nor clarity about what they are going to approve,” agreed different political and diplomatic sources consulted by DIVERGENTES for this article. “They do not know what to do with the rogue of the group,” they insisted.
In fact, the Secretary General of the OAS is looking for input and proposals to provide content to a meeting that, for now, continues without have a defined direction. The secretary general himself, Albert Ramdin, recognized that the organization needs “concrete proposals” and that it is up to the member States to agree on what type of political, economic or diplomatic pressure they are willing to exert on Managua. “We cannot continue saying the same things without acting,” he stated in an interview with Confidencial.
After the Sandinista strong man this past July 19th issued his challenge that “here there will be no more elections “, the OAS convoked the Permanent Council to a first session which ended in a diplomatic failure, marked by the apathy of the member countries. Later, the United States, which has led a stronger response against Ortega and Murillo, urged adopting a more active attitude. The Council met again on August 19th, and got a majority of 29 votes to convoke a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Americas, the highest level political meeting within the OAS.
In diplomatic corridors of the OAS an expectation set in that the foreign ministers meeting would be held before September 1, before the co-presidents approved the constitutional reform which not just would postpone the planned elections for November 2027, but would constitutionally proscribe the participation of dissidents considered “traitors to the fatherland”. In the face of the apathy of the OAS, once again the regime got the upper hand and first approved the amendment in the first legislature.
The United State has been the first country to respond to the approved constitutional reforms. This Wednesday September 2 Marco Rubio, the Secretary of State, urged his international partners to break the normalcy with the “brutal Ortega-Murillo dictatorship”. “Dictatorships that deny the inalienable rights of their citizens should not enjoy the same economic or political benefits as governments committed to the defense of peace and hemispheric security,” stated the official of the Donald Trump administration. “The United States urges its international partners to immediately cease maintaining normal relationships with this brutal dictatorship.”
The rift with the United States
Despite the insistence of the United States for regional actions which agree with their own, the panorama in the OAS is not very encouraging. One diplomatic source from the organization explained to DIVERGENTES that the eventual meeting of foreign ministers continues trapped, first of all, in basic procedure.
The OAS still must complete the formal steps of the Consultation Meeting, like approving its regulations and defining the presidency of the body, before setting a date for the meeting of the foreign ministers. The afternoon of Wednesday September 2 the organization said that that procedural meeting will be held at noon on Thursday [September 3].
Now among the options that are circulating for scheduling the foreign ministers meeting is September 17, even though there is a consideration to move it to after the General Assembly of the United Nations, which will begin on Tuesday September 8, 2026. But behind that delay are the differences between several governments and the United States over the policy of Donald Trump.
Canada is one of the most sensitive cases. Even though it has been one of the most active countries in the regional response to Managua, diplomatic sources state that Ottawa has begun to show greater reserves, in the midst of the deterioration of their relationship with the Trump administration and “doubts about the coherency of the US strategy” to Ortega and Murillo.
One of the “contradictions” which most bothers the Canadians was exposed September 2nd, when Marco Rubio asked the partners of the United States to cease maintaining “normal relations with the regime”, while Washington at the same time was trying to reestablish their diplomatic representation at the highest level in Managua, after the nomination of Natasha Franceschi as the new ambassador.
“The problem of the current diplomacy of the United States in the OAS is that it says one thing to one country, and it says something else to another. It is like President Trump: they tell you something depending on what his mood is on getting up in the morning”, said one of the sources within the organization knowledgeable about the negotiations.
A more legalistic discussion adds to those doubts. Canada has expressed reserves about the possibility of creating a special commission for Nicaragua after the foreign ministers meeting, under the argument that the country no longer is part of the OAS, and that a mechanism of this nature would imply assigning resources from the organization. The objection has added another point of friction in a discussion already marked by differences with Washington.
The big thorns in the side of the OAS: Mexico and Brazil
Despite the “inconsistencies” blamed on Washington, diplomats consulted by DIVERGENTES recognize that a concrete accomplishment of the US negotiation was “having aligned” the small states of the Caribbean, historically more distant from or not very involved in the Nicaraguan crisis. The negotiations of the Subsecretary of State Christopher Landau helped win over this block and were decisive in getting the 29 votes that supported the foreign ministers meeting on August 19th.
But the thorns in the side of the OAS continue being Mexico and Brazil. Mexico maintains its traditional non-intervention posture, while Brazil has taken on an even more resistant position in the face of the initiatives promoted by Washington. Beyond the internal calculations of each government, including the political outlook of Luis Inácio Lula de Silva, diplomatic sources pointed out a common factor: the tensions of both countries with Trump on the hemispheric level have fed their suspicions about any US proposal concerning Nicaragua.
To this is added another difficulty which has to do with the fact that the Trump administration still “has not clearly identified what concrete measures” they want to take to the foreign ministers meeting for their approval.
In the face of this Mexican and Brazilian resistance, dissident organizations and Nicaraguan civil society have intensified their negotiations with both governments. In a letter sent to the Mexican president Claudia Sheinbaum, eleven organizations asked Mexico to actively participate in the foreign ministers meeting and use their “prestige and leadership” to contribute to creating the conditions for a democratic, peaceful, and orderly transition in Nicaragua, with authentic, competitive, and transparent elections.
In contrast they asked Brazil to support “coordinated and peaceful diplomatic actions” and support measures that would begin with the immediate liberation of political prisoners and the reestablishment of fundamental liberties, as prior steps to a political outcome to the crisis.
“We are trying our best to get something to come out of this meeting of foreign ministers, not just a declaration, with the only difference being that is was signed by foreign ministers instead of ambassadors,” said one of the dissidents who are lobbying Mexico and Brazil.
Nevertheless, the diplomatic sources clarify that this does not mean that these governments have quit condemning the authoritarian drift of Ortega and Murillo. What changed is that the consensus which previously existed around the Nicaraguan case “is now contaminated by the bilateral relations which each country has with Washington.”
The tensions with the Trump administration, they insist, have turned “the serious issue of Nicaragua in another terrain on which hemispheric disputes with the United States are projected.” “Canada is one of the clearest examples, but not the only one. Chile, which previously showed itself enthusiastic with a regional response, today appears rather more withdrawn,” according to the same sources.
“The problem continues being internal”
Diplomatic sources consulted by DIVERGENTES also did not find much incentive in a Nicaraguan opposition which continues to be fragmented, faces internal disputes, and has not been able to articulate a common strategy and alternative to the international community. A block has tried to move the positions of governments like Mexico and Brazil, intensified diplomatic efforts, and even presented a transition proposal, but those efforts have not been able to be translated into a broader cohesion of the opposition.
While some opposition sectors rely nearly exclusively on pressure from Washington, and others reject any initiative associated with the Trump administration, among the foreign ministers the perception persists that there does not yet exist a sufficiently cohesive political counterpart to accompany an eventual strategy of regional pressure.
The analyst from the Interamerican Dialogue, Manuel Orozco, also places part of the problem within the opposition itself and warns that a solution cannot rest solely on external pressure.
“The problem continues to be internal”, he said to DIVERGENTES, and was even harsher in referring to the most radicalized sectors: “It is like they are working for the dictators.” The criticism coincides with an analysis which he published August 31 in Confidencial, where he questioned the tendency of some leaders to overstate a negotiation or decisive pressure of the United States and maintained that the disunity, hyperboles, and lack of a realistic strategy end up creating distrust among international actors and giving a greater margin to Ortega and Murillo.
The “rogues” at an advantage
In the face of this complex panorama, those who appear to have the advantage are the “rogue” co-presidents. Ortega and Murillo already moved first and approved the constitutional reform, while the OAS still is discussing how to get their foreign ministers to meet and what to do. “Nor is it that easy for all the foreign ministers to travel,” the diplomatic sources agreed.
For Juan Diego Barbarena, the extension of the co-presidential term until 2028 also responds to a calculation considering the Trump administration, with the intention of Ortega and Murillo breaking through the current cycle of international pressure and gaining time before any eventual electoral commitment.
The former deputy Eliseo Núñez takes that reading even further. In his judgement, the co-presidents want to make the end of their new term coincide with the end of the term of the Republican president. If international pressure would force them to negotiate electoral conditions, they could accept commitments with an implementation date in 2028 and bet on the fact that, at that time, Washington might have less capacity or willingness to demand its compliance.
This move fits with a well know practice of the regime. In the face of external pressure, Ortega and Murillo do not necessarily cede, but they adjust the schedule, moderate the form, and preserve the substance, both dissidents agreed. While the OAS tried to build consensus and the opposition continues without unifying, the “rogue” co-presidents continue to manage time in their favor.
The “toolbox” now involves unilateral decisions
In the light of the lack of a common response within the OAS, several of the pressure mechanisms against the Ortega Murillo regime depend now on what each government is willing to do on their own, agreed the sources consulted for this article. It is also the logic proposed by the analyst Manuel Orozco, who insists in the fact that there is a big “tool box”, even though no measure works on its own.
Among the possible actions are:
- Call ambassadors from Managua in for consultation
- Increase diplomatic and political isolation
- Expanding sanctions on businesspeople connected to the regime
- Applying commercial and tariff measures
- Imposing financial restrictions
- Hardening controls over oil and gas flows
- Activating bilateral legal instruments, like the Nica Act and the RENACER act in the United States
- Conditioning pressure on concrete objectives, like the liberation of political prisoners, reestablishment of freedoms, and the opening of a mechanism for political consensus
- Reinforcing actions of soft power against propaganda and disinformation
Orozco warns that the problem is not the lack of tools, but the lack of political will, coordination, and clear objectives for using them in a joint manner. In the current scenario, in addition, several of these decisions “depend on what each government is willing to do on its own.”
