Constitutional reforms and the crisis of dynastic succession

By Juan-Diego Barbarena

In Divergentes, September 2, 2025

The constitutional amendments implemented this year by the dictatorship of Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo cannot be explained without considering the critical moment which is coming for dynastic succession. Constitutional reforms always respond to the legal-political needs of a certain historical moment, and in the case of Nicaragua this has never been the exception. The recent constitutional history of the country has been punctuated by the political process which culminated in the absolutist and family constitution which was approved in February of 2025.

The constitutional dismantling and fraud of February has at least three objectives for the Ortega-Murillo dictatorship:

The urgent need to have a legal formula at this level which would make the succession of Rosario Murillo viable.
The absolute concentration of power in the hands of the presidency, with full control over all State organs in pursuit of some political guarantees for the succession.
The de-constitutionalization of the fundamental rights of Nicaraguans which have lost all efficacy.

It is a type of repressive constitutionalism which had its biggest manifestation with the Stalinist constitution of 1936 and was approved in the midst of the Great Purge. We can ask ourselves whether it is coincidental that the reform of February as well as the successive four reforms of the last months have been approved within the framework of the Great Purge of Rosario Murillo. Objective elements do indicate, then, that everything is part of the succession plan which every day is becoming more unviable for “Murillismo”.

The most authorized doctrine – according to the pen of professor Pedro De Vega – has pondered the functions of constitutional reforms, among which are highlighted: adapt the fundamental norms to the legal and historical reality; ensure the legal continuity of the legislation and the State without breaking with previous legislation; and being a basic institution for guaranteeing constitutional Supremacy through its aggravated procedure of modification which the Constitution enjoys, which establishes it as the Lex Suprema of the legal order. None of the approved reforms reveal these functions, but just the opposite, they have turned the Constitution into just another norm in the regulatory system (which ceased to be complex), subjected to the mercy of the whims of the dictatorship.

The amendments are a response exclusively directed to remedy the critical gaps which dynastic succession faces, So, the May reform tries to electorally inhibit hundreds of thousands of Nicaraguans who have acquired a second nationality, clearing the way for a possible electoral outcome. The reforms of August have the objective of closing the circle of Murillo´s control considering an eventual succession: ensuring the subjection of the prosecutorial body and the rest of the Ministries and State institutions through the Supra Ministry of Justice, which inspires the patrimonial apprehension of the entire membership of the Sandinista Front under the false slogan of “Everyone against corruption.”

In addition, the division of the police leadership[1] is only understood in the environment of distrust and need that loyalties be contested among those servile to the tyranny: the greater division of the repressive hierarchical command, the less possibility of internal police conflicts and uprisings, even though they run the risk of creating factions within the police which could devolve into fights.

In synthesis, the constitutional reforms do not respond to technical requirements nor requirements for the expansion of the list of rights, but the construction of a political ordering that responds to the critical moments which the dynastic succession is experiencing, and that is why they did not even take the time in the Assembly of the dictatorship for the constitutional reform initiatives to comply with their special processing procedures, and furthermore, for that reason they approved its developmental laws, like the Organic Law for the Procurator of Justice, or the reform of the Police Law, before having approved the modifications to the Constitution in a second legislative session[2], supervening all this legislation, thus making it unconstitutional.

The unviability of the succession

On other occasions I have tried to point out the causes that make the succession from Daniel Ortega to Rosario Murillo unviable, and the current political panorama has not eliminated the obstacles, precisely because Murillo, as the heiress of power – facing the absence of a source of legitimacy – has drifted away from “power or death”, as Oscar René Vargas has said, without possibility of return. Nevertheless, there are external and internal factors over which she has no control.

The first has to do with the life expectancy of the heiress. Rosario Murillo now is 74 years old, and if we judge her by her oral health and physical appearance, it seems that she does not enjoy a robust health which would allow her to live some five or ten more years in which she might consolidate the handover to her sons, while they “accumulate more experience.” Even though this is an important element to keep in mind, it does not seem to be the most determining element, given that in the end it is what it is: imponderable.
On the other hand, the dictatorship suffers from international bankruptcy. Before being held accountable in international organizations, they preferred to leave them, and their alliances on the international level are more of a geostrategic nature than any other type, and therefore, easily interchangeable. I am referring to their allies of China, Russia and Iran, in a context of disputes and negotiations on a global level, they do not ensure protection nor certainty for the dictatorship to be sustained in power through a dynasty. And if we turn to look at the region, the military maneuvers close to the maritime territory of Venezuela do not seem to be a good omen.
The complete rupture with the native oligarchy. Like the Somocista dictatorship, the Ortega-Murillo dictatorship is trying to replace it with a neo-bourgeoise one which has risen under the basis of power and corruption. All the businesses which bid on contracts either have the capital of Ortega or are colluding with them. Exactly the same thing that Somocismo did after the earthquake of 1972, which forced the bourgeoise to place themselves on the opposite side of the street. It is a critical scenario of succession where what is needed is not resources coming from just one source, but certainties to be able to project the dynastic project with stability. In this respect the backing of traditional capital is no small thing.
The imposition of absolute terror, even though it is strategic for immobilizing the citizenry, is not sustainable over the long term. Especially because that terror is now not just directed at dissidents, but also against the immense majority of the population, even the members and leaders, old and new ones, of what was the Sandinista Front. It is within the framework of this terror strategy that Rosario Murillo has unleashed the Great Purge against the old actors who represented the structures of state security, and against Bayardo Arce, Álvaro Baltodano, Néstor Moncada Lau, among others, precisely getting ahead of the crisis which is coming with the absence of Daniel Ortega. The quid of the issue resides in the fact that, just as the repression is inherent for the dictatorship to be able to be sustained in power in a transitory manner, so that the succession happens, the purges then are also necessary. Nevertheless, they have a limit, and the moment will come for internal mobilization and disputes over power within the structure of the dictatorship.

Somocismo was able to consolidate their dynasty because they brought together all the presuppositions which the Ortega-Murillos lack: a perverse alliance of support from the United States; tight agreements with big business and an important party lever. Added to the fact that the successors are very young,

As historians have already outlined, the fall of autocracies and long term regimes in Nicaragua have been because the power holders did not practice alternating leadership. This is key to understanding our political culture. The examples are numerous: Roberto Sacasa in 1893, the last president of the conservative republic; José Santos Zelaya; the Somozas, and now the Ortega-Murillos. None of those mentioned was willing to foster the conditions for an orderly departure from power, and all without exception left disastrously. And if there is an indisputable tribunal, it is the tribunal of history.

At the base of this situation: Will there be space for the second generation of the family?

In some collective analyses, an eventual exit scenario for the dictatorship emerges, but once the next generation takes power, i.e. the children of the co-dictators. The issue again is the capacity to succeed that they may have. This cannot be improvised and requires a bit of sympathy within the regime itself, an element which is impossible for Laureano Ortega to have, who is devoted to hypostasizing the dandypolitician with the thirty thousand dollars which he is wearing, while those who surround him live off perks and crumbs.

Nevertheless, the impossibility for the second generation to have space is found in the absence of factors of stability and the paranoia with which Rosario Murillo makes policy and tries to impose herself. Those persecuted will be everyone and will highlight, once again, that the regime is not monolithic. Will the Army have the last word?

[1] On August 29th Ortega named Victoriano Ruíz Urbina as “co-Director” of the Police to serve alongside Francisco Díaz.

[2] According to the constitution any constitutional amendments must be approved by two legislative sessions in two different legislative years, so if an amendment is approved in a legislative session of 2025, it must also be ratified in a legislative session in 2026 to have legal validity.