“The proposal of a Transition Junta  comes from the center-right, but we wanted to avoid any ideological reference”

“The proposal of a Transition Junta  comes from the center-right, but we wanted to avoid any ideological reference”

“The proposal of a Transition Junta  comes from the center-right, but we wanted to avoid any ideological reference”

In DIVERGENTES by Wilfredo Miranda Aburto,

Wednesday August 26, 2026

The transition proposal promoted by a sector of the opposition brings together elements from previously presented initiatives by organizations like UNAMOS, UNAB and the Space for Dialogue and Convergence of Nicaraguan Actors, but it seeks to provide them more structure and level of detail. Its promoters clarify that they do not intend that this document become the platform that unites all the opposition, but to put it under discussion, receive contributions and open a debate about how to conduct an eventual democratic transition in Nicaragua

A Junta of up to seven members will temporarily assume the functions of the head of State and Government, will have limited executive and legislative faculties, and will lead Nicaragua during a maximum period of 24 months toward a new Constitution and general elections. This is the nucleus of a transition proposal prepared by a sector of the Nicaraguan opposition which seeks to put on the table a road map for the eventual end of the dictatorship of Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo, above all within the context of international pressure on the copresidents led by the United States through the Organization of American States (OAS).

The document proposes immediately freeing political prisoners, restoring rights to those exiled and denationalized, reorganizing the Judicial Branch and the electoral system, dismantling repressive structures, and restructuring the high command of the Police and Army. It also proposes electing a Constituent National Assembly in 180 days, submitting the new Constitution to a referendum, and celebrating general elections on month 22 of the transition, with the transfer of power happening two months later.

Even though the initiative emerged from sectors identified with the center right, its promoters maintain that they intentionally avoided giving it an ideological definition and that that has been well received. Juan Sebastián Chamorro explains to DIVERGENTES in this interview how this proposal came to be, what it seeks to achieve, and how they imagine a transition in a country with its democratic institutions dismantled.

What was the context for this transition initiative and who does it come from?

About a year ago several of us politicians, leaders, we began to talk about the importance of the generation of a transition plan. In 2024 we even made a visit to Santiago in Chile, as Monteverde, and there we spoke with Sergio Bitar, who played a fundamental role in the Chilean transition. We spoke with Sergio so he would give us some of his input. And I think that that meeting began to plant the seed for the importance of working on a realistic, implementable transition plan.

Then, some legal experts began to work. They have asked for anonymity, but they are people with a lot of experience in the legal field. They gathered different laws, proposals, etc. And then the project began to be presented in different spaces.

The proposal of a transitional Junta comes from a center-right sector of the opposition, but we wanted to avoid any ideological reference. We have not wanted the ideological connotation to be in the text of the proposal. It is evident where it comes from, but we have wanted to avoid it. The document does not even have the word “liberal” in it, for instance, and this was on purpose, in the sense that it feels more, let´s say, technical. And the reaction has been pretty positive, in the sense of focusing a little more on the content, on the words of the proposal.

In other words, you are circulating this proposal among other expressions of the opposition to see what happens, if they embrace it, take it up, or not? What are you looking for?

Yes. For example, right now it is in conversation within Monteverde itself. In other words, Monteverde has three blocks. The process was stalled a little there for reasons which are not relevant, because it has now been reactivated. And we have made presentations, and we are going to do more presentations to whoever wants to know it in detail. The proposal is pretty extensive. So, basically, what we are doing in reality here is making a proposal which I believe incorporates many of the elements of the others which have been presented so far. Because, in the end, it is the country itself, the problems are the same. It cannot be very different from the other proposals, right?

For example, UNAMOS did one of ten points which is called The time for liberty has arrived”, which says it is indispensable to move forward in the democratic transition. We read that, we analyzed it, but it was kind of a ten point proclamation.

Then, the Space for Dialogue and Convergence of Nicaraguan Actors has a four page document, much smaller yet, Toward a democratic transition with social justice and truth. This is another document which we have seen. The UNAB has a proclamation for memory, but based on all this we have proposed something with a greater degree of detail.

In this proposal there is always an element of justice, there is always a topic of political prisoners, restitution of rights, safe return for those in exile, communications media, return of the communications media, and all the rest…

So, what we are trying to do here is provide a little more structure, and that is what has created, I believe, more attention, which is precisely the objective of the proposal with the reference to, let´s say, the transitional junta.

Just the name alone “junta” has generated a lot of tension. So, if you focus on the summary there, we have said, “transitional junta or team”. The name is irrelevant, it is just to not raise suspicions nor memories that for some could be positive and for others negative. But we do believe that it is important that power falls on someone during the transition process.

Do you hope that, in some way, this proposal might be a type of catalyst or achieve that unity of the opposition around something, become an alternative which has not existed up to now?

Well, look, I believe that in the General Assembly of the OAS in Panama and the vote of the Permanent Council last week, they have demonstrated that, in action, we are working well and in a coordinated fashion. But, let´s say, we did not think about doing a document around which everyone would unite. That I believe would be very arrogant on our part.  But what we want is that it be shared, that it be seen, that the content be discussed, regardless of who presents it, and to see if there are things that can be debated, discussed.

For example, there is some opposition to the functions of the junta; for example, if the junta would have too much legislative power or a minimum of legislative power, because it predominates…I am getting away from your question, but the illustration is important.

There are people, let´s say, who do not want a new National Assembly like 1990, where those who experienced it believe that the transition to democracy suffered a lot because of those divisions that existed in the Assembly. But the same thing can happen also in the transitional Executive branch.

So, there are now specific issues about the proposal. But, in short, we have not thought of it as a unifying document of the opposition. Really it is a proposal.

There are other issues that are important. Let us remember that this is a plan, and this is also another criticism which is made: “Why are we talking about a plan for the day the dictatorship falls if it has not fallen? You have to look for a plan for it to fall.”

Well, the thing is we are going piece by piece. It is important to have a plan from D day on forward. And from D Day to here we have one, we are preparing a plan and we are executing it, but they are two different instruments.

I rather see it as a necessity. We ask ourselves a lot, “Do they have a plan? What law are they going to reform?”. Even in the OAS, some representatives, with all good intentions and all, say, “a reform of the constitution would be critical.”

We do not believe that reforming the Constitution would be so critical. The Constitution as such is completely useless. I am talking about the bewitched constitution[1]. So, I mention this because I believe that the re-establishment, through a Constituent Assembly, is the important element for focusing the conversation. That there be a constitutional rebirth.

So, we are proposing holding an Assembly, and that that Assembly later submits it to a referendum, a plebiscite, and the population votes on that Constitution. So, that would be the ideal, then. It would be something very, very good to happen. So, it is a plan in that sense.

Now, what would have to happen, in the current context as it is configured, for Ortega and Murillo to lose real power over the Army, Police, the judicial system and to leave power? How are you envisaging it based on all the elements that exist in the environment?

I would love to have a single and accurate answer about what is going to happen. What we can do is continue working on the international sphere, applying pressure, and in the national sphere.

If you also notice in the proposal, that it is also a proposal with a political intentionality, it is a call to public functionaries, the Army, the Police, that if they have not committed crimes, there is a space for them in the transition.

So, this is not a naive declaration. This is a political proposal, to say to officers; “Look, if you do not agree with this, and you are not doing it to clean your image, or so you are not accused of crimes, which is non-negotiable, but if you have not committed crimes and can step forward, you will be welcomed.”

So, it is not that argument about hanging all of them from a tree. That I believe is another contribution of the proposal.

But, all of a sudden, you do not address this either, eventually, I don´t know, won´t you have to deal with figures of the likes of Gustavo Porras[2], or someone who, in an eventual fall of the married couple, could remain with a type of influence within the country?

Well, it would not be the most pleasant thing, right? Dealing with subjects of that nature. But, again, transition processes are horrendously complicated processes.

So, where there are bitter pills to swallow, and this affects both sides, well. I am sure that many of them would not be disposed to sit down with some of us either. But transition processes at times look for personalities, leaders who can serve as bridges.

So, obviously, Porras is not a reference to anything. But maybe there could be some other element of the outgoing regime that could have some space. And I believe that that is the most, let´s say, audacious part of the proposal: to say that elements of the outgoing regime would be considered.

You talk about a Constituent Assembly to demolish a Rule of law that has been destroyed – it is worth repeating – by the dictatorship with the imposition of a Constitution that we already are familiar with. Why?

Because the people are the constituents at the end of the day. The Constituent Assembly is just an instrument for redacting the project, approve it among its members, so that the words be the most appropriate ones.

And there is a very important opportunity to make a Constitution which lasts, and later submit it to the vote of the people. That, as far as I remember, has never been done in the history of Nicaragua.

So, the constitutional lawyers insisted a lot on this, that it would be something possible. Let´s see, if you, to reform the Constitution – for example the Constitution of the 1980s – you would have to, in some way, use two legislative sessions, and for larger reforms there are the instruments of the referendum and the plebiscite, with even more reason for a new Constitution you have to have a voting process.

It can be done within 45 days, according to the experts. And the writing of the Constitution, in nine months.

Of course, because the calendar that you propose says: “180 days, new Constitution; referendum; general elections in month 22.” My question is: in a country, I don´t know, institutionally destroyed, people exiled, denationalized, political parties cancelled, everything that we know, is it a realistic term or does it rather send a political signal that you can have a feasible timeline?

There is a timeline. How feasible is it? That is the question. Initially we had it in 30 months.  We saw that as too long, because we also do not believe that the unlimited temporal power should be for very long, and that the junta should get, as they say, too comfortable in the big chair, because we already know that transitions at times get off track. So that is a concern.

For example, we looked at the analysis of the 1990 elections. And why those of 1990? Because there was no structure. In other words, there was no electoral roll, not even identity cards. And those who worked on it then recall that it was organized in six months.

So, we say, “with the technology that exists today, it could be done in six months.” But in the proposal the more technical vision of the matter experts prevails more. In other words, the cleanup of the electoral rolls you cannot do in less than six months.

So, the sense of haste exists, but also the need that the process have adequate quality control. And at times haste can be the enemy of the good.

Now, playing the devil´s advocate, you propose a transition junta with very broad executive, legislative faculties. But if someone comes and asks you where does the political and legal legitimacy come from, if it does not spring from a prior election nor an existing institutionality, what will you be able to say?

First of all, there is no possibility of elections the day after D Day, because of the second part of your question: that there is no existing institutionality.

The ideal would be, effectively, that the structure existed and elections would be called…But the fact is, in addition, to hold elections you have to give time to the candidates to hold their campaigns and all of that.

So, immediately, it is even going to be very difficult for the junta to be elected in a process with a Supreme Electoral Council. And we thought about that a lot: how to fill that gap. So, there is where the issue of the assistance of the international community comes in, right?

Of course.

And the OAS. That is why that it is also important for us that conversation about the transition in this moment, in light of what is happening in the OAS.

Remember that the meeting of the foreign ministers in 1979 called for the resignation of Anastasio Somoza and the re-establishment of a new democratic and pluralistic government.

So, on that latter part, “pluralistic and democratic”, is what we are concentrating on, so that, let us say, what comes out in the very least is a plan, a democratic process. That is what the elections are for, what the Constituent Assembly is for.

Would this be the first real and concrete plan on the table, which is known so far in that sense?

I believe so. Because there are other documents, as I was telling you. But I do not want to let go of the question of legitimacy, because it is important. The international community can play a key role. In other words, there is a lot of talk about the difficulty that the OAS has in being politically effective. And that is true in the stage in which we are now. What type of pressure does it have? It is very difficult.

But on transition issues, issues of electoral observation, it has all the experience which it has demonstrated. So, we see there a major role of the OAS, and above all, playing a role in the transition, providing legitimacy to this process.

If tomorrow the OAS or the international community says to you, “We agree with this transition junta, with this plan, but we need to know who is going to carry it out and how it begins,” what would be the first concrete and verifiable step which is not inscribed within a declaratory framework of this roadmap?

Transition processes in practice occur with conversations, right?, which do not exist in this moment. And I am not talking about the international community. I am talking about elements of the outgoing regime.

In transition processes there are always the outreach of elements who do not see continuity as a solution and say, “Hey, you have to sit down with those people because this is already coming to an end, or has ended, died, or whatever.”

So, for me this type of conversations are the trigger. Not dialogues under bright lights and tables and all. No. Rather overtures.

The role of the diplomats can play an important role, etcetera, so that in some way that takes structure. That is where transitions begin.

No one from the regime has reached out yet?

The problem is that, if we say they have, we would be, let´s say, burning the possibility.

[1] Literally “La Chamuca” or the Witch, a common slang term to refer to the Constitution resulting from the reform of February 2025 which created the co-presidency of Rosario Murillo.

[2] Gustavo Porras has been the President of the National Assembly since Ortega´s return to power